Group 42-Sells Out! - The Information Archive/Group 42 Sells Out (Group 42) (1996).iso/survival/infowar/iw_dver2.txt

Text File | 1996-03-01 | 114KB | 2,270 lines

                                    Draft 2.0 for Discussion Only











                        DISCUSSION PAPER






                       INFORMATION WARFARE

                Developing a Conceptual Framework






                          DRAFT VER 2.0





                        LT (N) R Garigue
           Strategic Information Technology Specialist
  Office of the Assistant Deputy Minister (Defense Information
                            Services)
                    [e-mail]
          Url:http://www.cse.dnd.ca/~formis/overview/iw













In the course of reviewing and revising this document a special
note of thank you for the contributions and comments by:

          Donna G. Schutzius, Major, USAF
          Milan Kushta, Communication Security Establishment, DND
          Tiit Rommet, Directorate Scientific and Technical
Intelligence, DND
          LeRoy Pearce, Senior Technology Advisor to ADM (DIS)
DND











                            Contents

1. INTRODUCTION                                                 6



2. INITIAL CONDITIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF INFORMATION WARFARE  9

2.1. THE EVOLUTION OF COMPUTER CONTROL                          9

2.2. THE MOVE FROM CONTROL TO COORDINATION                     10

2.3. VIRTUAL INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTS                          10

2.4. KNOWLEDGE BASED WORK                                      11

 2.4.1. FROM INFORMATION MANAGEMENT TO KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT   12

 2.4.2. KNOWLEDGE ENABLED ORGANIZATIONS                       13

2.5. THE IT INFRASTRUCTURE - GLOBAL NETWORKS                   14

 2.5.1. THE ORIGIN OF THE NETWORK                             15

 2.5.2. GROWTH OF THE INTERNET                                15

 2.5.3. INTEREST GROUPS AND VIRTUAL COMMUNITIES               16

 2.5.4. VALUE SYSTEMS AND POLITICAL ACTION                    17

2.6. THE ECONOMICS OF COORDINATION AND COOPERATION             18

 2.6.1. THE CREATION OF WEALTH: KNOWLEDGE VERSUS CAPITAL      18

 2.6.2. THE NETWORK AS BROADCASTER AND AMPLIFIER              19

2.7. TAXONOMY AND NATURAL MUTATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS      19

 2.7.1. CONVERGENCE OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SYSTEMS          19

 2.7.2. CONVERGENCE OF LOCAL AND GLOBAL SCOPE.                20

 2.7.3. CONVERGENCE OF FUNCTIONALITY.                         20

 2.7.4. CONVERGENCE OF REPRESENTATIONS.                       20

2.8. TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS                20

3. INFORMATION WARFARE                                         22

3.1. INFORMATION SUPERIORITY                                   22

3.2. DEFINITION OF INFORMATION WARFARE                         22

3.3. ADVANTAGES OF INFORMATION WARFARE                         24

3.4. COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE                               25

3.5. NEW MILITARY INFORMATION SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES           27

3.6. DISPLACEMENT OF WARFIGHTING ACTIVITIES                    27

3.7. INFORMATION WARFARE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK                  28

 3.7.1. INFORMATION WARFARE TARGET ANALYSIS                   29

 3.7.2. TYPES OF TARGET                                       29

 3.7.3. TYPES OF WEAPONS                                      31

3.8. ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMATION WARFARE STRATEGIC MATRIX      36

 3.8.1. PREDICTABLE OUTCOMES                                  37

 3.8.2. UNPREDICTABLE OUTCOMES                                37

3.9. IW CONTROL MODELS AND DECISION SYSTEMS                    39

 3.9.1. SENSORS/WEAPONS AND PLATFORMS                         40

 3.9.2. FROM SIMPLE CYBERNETICS TO MULTI-AGENT CONTROL        40

3.10. VISUALIZATION AND SEMIOTICS                              41

3.11. OFFICER TRAINING AND EDUCATION                           42

4. CONCLUSION                                                  44

5. BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                45




                              Thema



          These rules, the sign language and grammar of
          the   Game,  constitute  a  kind  of   highly
          developed   secret  language   drawing   upon
          several  science  and  arts,  but  especially
          mathematics   and  music,  and   capable   of
          expressing          and          establishing
          interrelationships between the  contents  and
          the   conclusions  of  nearly  all  scholarly
          disciplines, The Glass Bead Game  is  thus  a
          mode  of playing with the total contents  and
          values of our culture; it plays with them as,
          say,  in  the  great age of the arts  painter
          might  have  played with the  colors  of  his
          palette.  All  the insights, noble  thoughts,
          and  works  of  art that the human  race  has
          produced  in  its  creative  eras,  all  that
          subsequent  periods of scholarly  study  have
          reduced   to   concepts  and   converted   to
          intellectual  property - on all this  immense
          body  of  intellectual values the Glass  Bead
          Game  player  plays like an organist  on  the
          organ.

                           Herman Hess
               Magister Ludi - The Glass Bead Game
                   Translated from the German
                       Das Glasperlenspiel
                              1943


                       INFORMATION WARFARE

                Developing a Conceptual Framework


1.   Introduction

Information has been recognized as a strategic resource which
must be effectively managed to maintain a competitive and
evolutionary advantage. Because of its critical role in reducing
uncertainty, structuring complexity, and generating greater
situational awareness, any action taken in the information domain
can leverage tremendous effects in the physical domains of
resources such as material, personnel and finance as well as more
abstract domains such as belief systems. It also extend the range
of new options for a planner or decision maker. As information is
becoming more and more available in a digital format, ever
increasingly powerful computational processes permits completely
new forms of military endeavors that will require new
organizations, activities, skills and mandates.

This essay introduces the concept of Information Warfare. It
describes events in the development of computer technology which
has lead to the development of the concept, describes and
proposes a conceptual analysis framework to assist in the
elopement of military new capabilities which will be required to
respond to possible emerging vulnerabilities and opportunities.

The concept of Information Warfare (IW) may be considered as an
overarching view of how modern warfare must be approached. It is
a conceptual framework which assists in the development of not
just military plans, projects, and capabilities, but how all
government agencies involved in crisis management and conflict
resolution. It also helps in the design, development and
implementation of  Command and Control Information Systems
(C2IS).

With any new integrative concept, the notion of the paradigm
arises. If the concept is sufficiently broad, then the new
paradigm reveals both the flaws in the old way of thinking and
offers at the same time new levels of efficiency and
effectiveness enabled by new types of integrative processes.
Information Warfare has been brought about by the Information
Technology revolution, advances in Information Management (IM)
and the emerging concerns for Knowledge Management. The Senior
Technology Advisor to the Assistant Deputy Minister proposal on
Information Management Core Capability Areas describes
Information Warfare as one of the four central pillars supporting
the Department of National Defense and the Canadian Forces vision
of how to achieve Information Superiority in military affairs.


These for core capabilities are seen in fig 1 and are comprise of
Joint Surveillance Systems, Information Technology, Knowledge
Management for Decision Support and Information Warfare.



                            Figure 1
                        Core Capabilities

As will be shown in much more detail later Information Warfare
includes military functions such as Information Collection
Management, Assessment, Risk Assessment and Command and Control
Warfare. But IW integrates these activities in a different and
novel way through the use of modern information technologies. In
many respect this is still uncharted territory for the military.
Because of increased efficiency and effectiveness, Information
Warfare has also some new inherent and totally distinct
capabilities that emerge from this integration and the new
ôDomainö in which it occurs. Some call this ôDomainö: Cyberspace,
others the National Information Infrastructure. Its name is less
important than the fact that this new soci-technical space
permits qualitatively superior levels of military and
governmental action.

A note of prudence. In writing this document none of the
functions were viewed with organizational structure in mind
however in trying to describe some of the activities, references
to present organizational structures are made. This is because
sometimes new realities can only be described in terms of what is
know and because of this analogical vice of discourse, some
ambiguity and confusion remains. The development of a conceptual
framework will help highlight what activities are truly new and
what military activities are simply a recasting of know
activities within this new Information Warfare framework.


More and more, the ability of the military to participate in
employment that ranges across the full spectrum of conflict is
dependent upon it's information processing capabilities,
knowledge management and information system infrastructure. The
ability to develop synergy and maintain network operations in the
face of opposing disruptions is becoming the fundamental key to
successful military action.

It is important to acknowledge that there is a wide and growing
debate about what is Information Warfare. Several military
structures are attempting to describe, agree and leverage the
concept of Information Warfare. Some of these efforts are done
without the benefit of having a consensus and agreement of what
is Information Warfare. Some nations military have set up several
Information Warfare units. In the US the Army, Navy and Air Force
are trying to develop Information Warfare capabilities. The same
debate is seen taking place in the UK and Australia. Canada has
just joined the Information Warfare discussions but has, at
present, no organization that deals formally with the Information
Warfare issues and concerns. One of the secondary objectives of
this essay is to act as a means to raise the awareness on
Information Warfare issues and help in planning any
implementation.


2.   Initial Conditions for the Emergence of Information Warfare

It is not possible to talk about Information Warfare without a
brief discussion of the conditions which brought about its
emergence. These conditions arise from the change in computer
technology with its resulting impact on organization and decision
making processes. The economics of computer production account
for the lowering of cost and increased power account for the
rapid spread of computer technology. In no other technical area
is the cost of the required basic building block decreasing while
at the same time increasing in performance in such a dramatic
way. Many of the advances are being driven by the commercial
needs of world wide market competition. The results of these
developments can be brought to bear on Defense and Governmental
efforts and activities as they pertain to conflict resolution,
crisis management and military activities.

Some aspects of military information technology, however, will
not be feasible without some DND R&D support and participation.
Specifically long range communication, operation in harsh and
hostile environments, identification of friend from foe, global
positioning, imagery and visualization, network security, data
and information fusion, and unique decision support tools and
systems. These areas need to be further developed by DND if we
want to be able to maintain world wide near real time awareness
and participation in the full range of conflict resolution
activities.




2.1  The Evolution of Computer Control
The computer has been in existence for more than 40 years. It has
gone through four major architectural transformations. The type
of control that they exercise upon processes have taken several
forms. Each being more complex that the other. There has been a
diffusion of control as the system have evolved. From a unique
centrally control monolithic approach to a more democratic ôpeer
to peerö collegiate type of control. Computers architecture have
gone through the "Batch Processing" architecture, the "Time
Sharing", the "The Desk Top" and now finally to  the "Network"
phase. This latest model will dominate and subsume all the others
as the most efficient structure for controlling information
processing. Naturally there will be further innovations as
networks become pervasive and ubiquitous but the network model
will be the one that will dominate the computing paradigm for
years to come. Changes will have more to do with quantitative
improvements rather than in the development of a radically new
type of control structure. Intelligent and cooperative
information systems using software agents are seen as the way to
resolve the present problems of localized data dictionary and
information model incompatibility. These harmonization efforts
are focused on achieving "semantic interoperability". But this
issue has more to do with ensuring common interpretation of the
data - the ômeaningö problem-  that the structural one on which
network control is firmly established. The spread of the networks
is an indication of its success.


2.2  The move from control to coordination
The development of the network also results in significantly
different structure and pattern of problem solving work. Computer
information networks break down strict hierarchies structures and
organizational boundaries. It helps create virtual and
distributed organizations focused more on the design and delivery
of value added products and services. Mostly because ôprocessö
activities are taken care of by the computer information
infrastructure and the network itself. Virtual workgroups
concentrate their effort on the earlier phases of planning and
problem solving The work they do may or may not be part of the
vision, mission, or mandate of the host organizations in which
these individual work but come together because of the importance
of the problems at hand  for example a crisis, environmental
issues, human rights, conflicts, etc.). These temporary
organizations can mobilize a great quantity of resources and
synchronize activities very successfully as they are more focused
on the problem than the maintenance over time of a permanent
organizational structure.

At present, military organizations spend a major portion of their
resources developing these coordinating capabilities. The present
emphasis on Joint and Combined capabilities is long overdue,
however, in wanting to achieve this coordination and
synchronization, the present main focus of effort has been on
trying to centralize control more than trying to put in place a
new integration and coordination mechanisms. The present approach
to Command and Control Information System interoperability
through common standards indicates that the thought process and
the push is still strictly aimed at a technology driven solution.
As important that this is, there is still need for a command
structure reengineering effort that permits faster decision
cycles and a better integration of all the military information
production elements such as Ops, Plans, Intelligence and Logistic
Support. This coordination activity must includes central
organizational elements such as Personnel, and Finance as well as
the counterpart capabilities components of each of the Army, Navy
and Air Force. The concomitant change that comes for accepting
the Information Warfare framework is the requirement for a
Command and Control Process Reengineering effort.


2.3  Virtual Information Environments
The military operating in an advanced computing environment would
have the following essential elements:

     a.   A hierarchy of powerful computing capabilities
     available to all personnel at all time, including portable
     computers, home computers, office computers, and various
     organizational and information production services. All
     stationary computers would be physically interconnected to
     very high bandwidth public networks. This means they are
     linked, for example, through fiber optic cables that allow
     large amounts of near real time multimedia information to be
     produced and distributed very quickly to selected consumers
     as well as being available on a pull basis to the rest of
     the community in case the information is found relevant to
     other types of problems. Advances in remote
     telecommunications access technologies allow access to these
     resources without a permanent connection.

     b.   Sophisticated interfaces that incorporate advanced
     cognitive ergonomic design concepts are employed. That is,
     the computers are extremely social. They have been designed
     to fit the way each individual works on a regular basis,
     even to fit the way people from different cultures work. The
     advances in Human Computer Interface have therefore enabled
     Social User Interfaces (SUI) that anticipates information
     requirements depending on the types of problems that is
     being worked on, the context and past requests. They support
     a variety on collection and communication, synthesis and
     visualization Knowbots. Knowbots and other software agents
     greatly simplify military personnel use of information
     technology. Knowbots are programs designed by their users to
     travel through a network, inspecting and understanding
     similar kinds of information, regardless of the language or
     form in which it is expressed. They produce the knowledge by
     linking of information. They act as templates that filter
     the information in accordance with prescribe rules and
     criteria. They are not just text retrieval processes but
     focus on concepts. Most of these Knowbots are active even
     when the user is not logged in.


2.4  Knowledge Based Work
Information is a strategic asset, however information is only one
level of structure in an representational epistemological
hierarchy. Information is organized data and data bases are prime
repositories of data. They are  structured in accordance with a
ontological model called the data dictionary that enables a user
to derive meaning from its contents. Not wanting to create an
academic debate on the subject, suffice it to say that "knowledge
is information organized for a particular purpose". [Nagao] It is
the way information relates to other information that is of
consequence to the discussion at hand. Furthermore, this
knowledge may be returned into information databases becoming
data for other information structuring processes. It is important
to realize that Information Warfare is in part an issue of
Knowledge Management. In itself information has no real value, it
is the meta management issues that derive its worth to the
problem at hand these meta- management issues can be regrouped
under the heading of Knowledge Management.


2.4.1     From Information Management to Knowledge Management
As network technology matures differentiation and specialization
of its components occur. Data-warehousing and massive archiving
are now the problems of the day. Large organizations are starting
to focus on the problems of storing and retrieving vast amounts
of information. These massive data sets are being called
different names such as Corporate Memories, Tactical Databases
and Military Datasets. At the rate information is being produced
and stored new data and information storage capabilities are now
seen as the weak point in the modern networked information
systems architecture. This problem encompass full life cycle
issues such as the cost of capturing storing retrieving  and
distributing data and information.

Information manifests the "What is happening", knowledge
personalizes "what does it mean" from the strict point of view of
a single observer with his or her specific interests and needs.
The same information means different things to different people
depending on the context. It is the creation of this context that
is the central point of knowledge management. Knowledge
Management addresses the problem of ôrelevanceö or ôpertinenceö
quality that information might or might not have with regard to
other information. The same piece of information such as
personnel status, depending on the context, could be of
organizational, tactical, operational, or strategic importance.
To make sense of vast amounts of information, to create the
context by with this information becomes pertinent, that it means
something to the user, it is necessary to use a schematization or
a model that help highlight the nature of the relationships
between this piece of information and another piece of
information. These models, for example a series of tactical
decision aids, also need to be managed as a unique critical
component of the overall information system. Therefore there is
now a clear requirement for Knowledge Management.

Knowledge Management presupposes that there is a sufficient level
of modularity in the system so that data the models and schema (
knowledge structuring processes) can be managed independently
from the data. Data repositories would be separated from the
query and search processes. It gives us the possibility to
develop very sophisticated "intelligent assistants" such as an
Anti Submarine Warfare Officer or a Navigation Officer. It must
be understood that managing these models (expert paragon) would
help truly confer to the system its effectiveness, whereas
managing information confers only efficiencies.

Knowledge Management is still in its infancy refers to the
problems associated with the creation, transformation, storage,
usage, and replacement of highly complex models and computational
structures that create meaning in an organizationally formalized
way . Knowledge Management is arising as the focus of the next
generation of software tools. At present this is yet to be fully
structured but the figure illustrates the present supporting
technologies.




                            Figure 2
          Knowledge Management Supporting Technologies


2.4.2     Knowledge Enabled Organizations
Having access to lots of information does not guarantee success.
In all military estimates, the most important question is ôWhat
Does It Mean"?. The knowledge workers - the problem domain
experts - are required to "make sense" of all that information.
It is their insight into the problems that will permit effective
action. Knowledge is power only if it is acted upon. Domain
specialists are the people in the field, but their capabilities
are limited and their skills uneven.

Some people make good decisions are good while others are low on
the learning curve. These decision making skills can be enhanced
by systematic Knowledge Management. Three main functions need to
be accomplished to enable any organization to pass from the level
of simple artisans to having knowledge enabled workers as shown
in figure 3. These are, Knowledge Formalization, Knowledge
Abstraction and Knowledge Diffusion.



                            Figure 3
                  Knowledge Enable Organization

Capturing and replicating the best models and processes will help
to increase the quality of the decision making processes. Case
Base Reasoning Systems have proven invaluable in the area of
Crisis Management. By capturing past cases and making them
available to other users in support of decisions increases the
number of options available to all decision makers and improves
overall organizational performance. This even if the actual
crisis has only some general similarities to past crises. This
type of approach automates the "lessons learned" and makes them
available to a user when similar conditions occur. Years of
experience as well as the most recent policies and guidelines are
made available based on the similarities between past cases and
actual cases.


2.5  The IT Infrastructure - Global Networks
The origin of global networks can be debated. Some authors might
say that it is international banking that was the first true
global network. Some international companies have developed very
extensive communication and transaction systems. World markets
are seen as the reason for this globalization. However, in
looking at the these examples of global networks they pale in
comparison to the rise of the Internet. There is no system that
reflects the democratization of information the way the Internet
does. It is also known historically that communication transforms
humanity. The use of computers for international communication
will further enhance and expand how humans connect, communicate
and create communities. This bring with it new dimensions in
world affairs.


2.5.1     The Origin of the Network
Some thirty years ago, the RAND Corporation, a think-tank, faced
the question on how the US authorities would communicate after a
nuclear war. How would the network itself be commanded and
controlled as any central authority would be a target for an
enemy missile.

The RAND proposal, made public in 1964, proposed a network with
no central control and which would be designed to operate even
with nodes destroyed. The proposal was to create a network built
with unreliable elements but still could ensure that the total
system would be reliable. All the nodes would communicate in a
peer to peer fashion, each having the right to originate, pass,
and receive messages. The messages themselves would be divided
into packets and each packet would be separately addressed. Each
packet would begin at some specified source node, and end at some
other specified destination node without any requirement to
specify the route to get there. Each packet would wind its way
through the network on an individual basis with the total message
being reconstructed at the end of the trip. If a node failed the
packets would simply find another route to their destination.
This structure became the foundation of the present system,
Arpanet, which over time became the Internet.


2.5.2      Growth of the Internet
It is strange to say but nobody really knows the full extent of
the Internet. There are estimates as to its size and growth. At
present, April 1995, there are approximately 8 million host
computers and between 10 and 50 million users connected to them.
It's growth is truly an exponential curve. It's nodes doubled in
the last year. According to the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, the total data that passed through the Internet Web
service in 1992 was 500 MB. By comparison, the total data that
was transmitted over the Web from January to March of 1993 was
about 5 GB. The Total amount of data sent over the Web in a six
hour period in September 1994 was 13 GB.


At present some say that the Internet population grows presently
by 10 to 15 percent every month and doubles every 53 days; other
say that by 2000 there will be as many as 100 million servers
connect to the Net. The latest figures indicate that the Internet
market (software, hardware and services) is worth approximately
$4.2 billion US.




                            Figure 4
                    Growth of Global Networks

With the availability "Internet Ready" operating systems and free
Internet browsing software, there is a situation that is so
dynamic that predictions on the growth of the Internet and the
resulting social effects are difficult to make. Furthermore, with
new services such as video conferencing, digital cash, public key
encryption, cybermalls, and virtual libraries being available
throughout the system, there is difficulty in grasping fully the
true extent of what an information based society is becoming.
With simple access to global network organizations are shifting
their focus away from the technology towards its social
consequences. Its impact is now seen in the realignment of
economic and social dynamics. All commercial organizations are
forced to enter a truly global market place and with it the
requirement to think and act both at a global level as well as a
local level.


2.5.3     Interest Groups and Virtual Communities
There is a large discussion on the question of the true nature of
communities that exists solely on the basis of the Internet. Non
withstanding the debate, the ability to share common interests is
sufficient for the Internet to bring together like minded
individuals and organizations in such a fashion that forces us to
review our concept of community.

The traditional interpretation of community includes a
geographical aspect. But the Internet has no limitation that
comes from geography nor national borders. A new type of
communities are emerging that have the characteristic of being
part of a global society - more accurate would be to talk about
global societies. This further accelerated the growth of the
Internet. At present no one would think of participating in any
computer activity without being part of the Internet.
Furthermore, not only for discussion of technical subjects these
global societies, are also exemplified by a number of Non
Governmental Organization (NGO) movements, interest groups,
environmental organizations  etc that find their leitmotif in
social advocacy. In fact they are now a force in international
relations, particularly with regard to crisis management,
political concerns, and social issues such as human rights, and
the environment simply because of their internet enabled
organization and structure. Finally the Internet itself is an
proposal for universal value and an open society


2.5.4     Value Systems and Political Action
Discussion groups, or newsgroups, reflect focused discussions
that occur within different communities. This is a world of news,
debate and argument. It is generally known as the USENET. USENET
is, in point of fact, quite different from the Web. USENET is
rather like communities streams of consciousness reflecting on
the subjects of the moment. USENET is not so much a physical
network as a set of social meetings. At the moment there are some
3,500 separate newsgroups on USENET, and their discussions
generate about 7 million words of typed commentary every day.
Naturally there is a vast amount of talk about technology but the
variety of subjects discussed is enormous and growing larger all
the time. USENET also distributes various free scientific,
social, and cultural electronic journals and publications.

As a consequence, global networks can enable the sharing of
collective goals, aims and ideals, and permit the exchange
relevant information amongst members. It also favors collective
decision making by means of consensus and reciprocal
relationships to meet the social, economic, cultural and world-
wide problems of living in a what has become the Information Age.
This positive scenario must be tempered with the fact that
counter-forces will also come into play. A rise of organizations
that favor dogmatism will also try to take advantage of global
networks to further their specific aims and objectives. Already
there are clear indications that tensions between opposing groups
have resulted in benign forms of ônetwarö such as the disrupting
of phone, Fax and computer services. Furthermore they are passing
from an individual to individual level to group to group level.
This trend will continue with in some cases devastating
consequences when some groups will use the power of the network
to impose their control over other groups. They can use the
network and its ability to leverage knowledge and power to
restrict, control, manipulate and destroy other communities.
Especially is these communities are dependent on the Internet as
part of their infrastructure.

To balance out this perspective it is also important to
acknowledge that the increased communication flows between
individuals of differing communities, in addition to the official
and sanctioned communication flows between governments, is seen
as another way to reduce tensions between opposing groups. There
is even a suggestion that putting in place rapidly an information
infrastructure that is accessible by all, (not jut official or
governmental decision makers) will reduce tension as more and
more people communicate and resolve contentious issues1.


2.6  The Economics of Coordination and Cooperation
For many the sheer existence of the Internet is still a paradox.
Why permit the give-away of so much information? It is seen as a
gesture that would defeat the underlying competitive motivation
that has been the motor of western civilization. Clearly the
breaking down of organizational boundaries and the emergence of
new types of loyalty and allegiances relationships between
individuals and organizations introduces new modes of behavior.
More and more individuals share their affiliation and loyalty
between a number of organizations, some of which have diverging
agendas (for example we may all deal with environmental
organizations, political parties, private corporations and
government). However, in large economic markets an overall
cooperative stance and strategy are more rational and leverage
additional benefits than conflictual situation (as illustrated by
recent game theory studies)2. Also, at the present, time there is
very little cost in respect of the benefits of being part of a
network such as the Internet.

Since each node is independent, handle its own financing and
technical requirements, connecting to the Internet costs little
or nothing if the organization you belong to is part of a
network. Like the phone network, the computer network becomes
steadily more valuable as it embraces larger and larger
territories of people and resources. The more it grows the more
it attracts and forces other users and networks to become part of
it. The Internet was a novelty for a while, but networking is now
an essential component of all social activities in all developed
societies. Furthermore it is now a prerequisite to growth and
development as well as maintenance of a quality of life.


2.6.1     The Creation of Wealth: Knowledge Versus Capital
Raw resources such as capital are becoming less and less a
limiting factor in the production of goods and services as better
processes improve our ability to substitute one component for
another. Every day we witness whole sectors of the economy
realign themselves to this constraint as automation leverages
more and more economic output and displaces traditional
production structures. We are now at a point where we can
substitute information and knowledge for capital.
The old adage "knowledge is power" is still true. Data,
information or knowledge become readily available in a digital
society. Open sources of intelligence as well as the emergence of
the commercially driven Competitive Intelligence activities make
data and information accessible to all. However it is the
application of that information and knowledge that makes the real
difference.

So it is not acquisition of knowledge for its own sake which is
the goal, rather it is its innovative use that permits the
creation of new capabilities. The military must understand that
knowledge management is intended to support and spread
innovation. What ôone knowsö rather than what ôone ownsö becomes
the basis for social, political and economic action. And this
power can be leveraged several times by embedding this
information and knowledge into smart technology.


2.6.2     The Network as Broadcaster and Amplifier
One new dimension of technology and the network in particular is
to act as a multiplier or an amplifier. As Electrical and
mechanical systems amplify force, now network amplifies
information. For the individual this means that in the network he
can have the same capacity as larger organizations in the
accomplishment of functions such as acquisition of information,
distribution, storage etc. This can be done by an individual with
using the network with a scope and expertise that rival what only
governments and large corporations use to be able to do.

In many respects, this single capability to access and process
vast amounts of information changes how public policy is
developed. Access to statistical and demographic information has
always a factor in how public policy has been determined. But now
this same capability is being used by individual, and
organizations to challenge government.


2.7  Taxonomy and Natural Mutation of Information Systems
As information technology becomes more and more powerful,
available and generic, the historical separation between
organizational computer information systems and military computer
information system will no longer be possible. The traditional
classification of information systems based on specific
intentions, and unique functionality can no more be applied. The
traditional Automatic Data Processing (ADP) and Management
Information Systems (MIS) on one hand, and operational and
embedded mission systems on the other, will be subsumed an
morphed into strategic information systems under the pressures
and demands for information integration and system
interoperability. Both outside and in DND there are important and
powerful "tendances lourdes" - technical and functional trends
that will condition and ultimately determine the nature of the
evolution of our information systems. We will observe and
experience several types of convergence:


2.7.1     Convergence of military and civilian systems
In a few years there will be little difference between
information systems in the field and the ones in the office.
Apart for differences in packaging, the hardware, the processor,
and the communication interfaces will be similar if not the same.
Systems can no longer be differentiated by hardware. Furthermore,
most Office Automation (OA) software suites will be universal and
will all have the same generic functions. The networks
themselves, by virtue of their ability to interconnect will carry
both organizational and operational information. In fact these
networks will also support Other Government Departments (OGD)
traffic.


2.7.2     Convergence of local and global scope.
Already there is a convergence towards unique military structure
that will permit information to flow to and fro between the
headquarters blending systems that had their initial purpose only
by a geographical scope. As there will be in both cases to
possibility to "see" the same data. The information systems will
be both capable of global and local views. The possibility to
"zoom in and out" or drilling into and out of areas of interest
will continue to make the present notion of tactical and
strategic systems somewhat ambiguous especially when coupled to
remote sensors and effectors.

2.7.3     Convergence of functionality.
All environmental command and control information systems will
have common subsystems, software applications and components. All
will have a geographical information subsystem (GIS), message
handling subsystem (MHS), Office Automation functions, voice and
teleconferencing capabilities, etc. Here again there will be a
requirement to rationalize their support at a national level. The
timing requirements of real time vs. near real time will continue
to be the sole differentiating factor between strategic
information systems and weapon systems. But real time and near
real time data will be blended and fused so that organic
information to the platform is fused with non organic
information. Third party targeting and dynamic multi dimensional
engagement based on force wide threat evaluation and weapon
assignments will further force this trend.

2.7.4     Convergence of Representations.
With the emphasis on joint and combined operations there is a
requirement for command and control systems to support a unified
representation as well as the traditional environmental warfare
views. There will be a requirement for common symbol sets and
representations of all aspects of battlefield activities, as well
as any conflictual situation such as peacekeeping and crisis
management.




2.8  Tactical and Strategic Information Systems
The consequence of this "convergence" is that information can no
longer be pre-defined in its nature as being solely strategic,
tactical, operational or organizational. In the past the systems
were clearly defined by the nature of their information content.
The linking and networking of different information systems
through the network abrogates the initial intention of these
information systems, and now information that was once
predetermined as being either organizational or operational are
both simply managed as strategic. As information systems merge,
information attribution is now more dependent on who and in what
context it is used than where it is contained. Now it is better
to focus on the decision making process as only will be able to
assess the scope of consequence that will help qualify the
military nature and context of the problem.

The discussion up to this point was to highlight and explain the
unique initial conditions that have brought about the emergence
of Information Warfare. The reason was to demonstrate the large
number of qualitative discontinuities in the technical, social,
and economic dimensions of information systems. Information
Warfare is the result of these discontinuities. I would like to
emphasize that Information Warfare is a new and unprecedented
situation. Information Warfare is not a continuation of what was
warfare. It is not just Command and Control Warfare nor is it
Computer Warfare. These are manifestations of Information Warfare
but as symptoms are not the consequence not the cause of a
situation these initial denotations are simple and temporary
interpretations of something much more complex, fundamental and
revolutionary. Information Warfare is an emergent reality that
comes from a self organization process that has never seen
before. The problem is that we talk about it using terms that
have well known connotations. And it is difficult to talk about
something completely new using words that bring with them
specific understanding and expectancies. The early period of the
automobile faced a similar situation. At one time it was called a
ôhorseless carriageö as this was the only way to define its
essential quality. As the negation of the only understood means
of propulsion - the horse. The car is more than a carriage
without a horse. This is the dilemma we face when we discuss
Information Warfare. Old words do not explain something new. and
the danger is that the use of familiar words misrepresent and
mask the true extend of the revolution that will have to take
place if we are to be able to retain a military capacity in a new
physical, social and cognitive space.


3.   Information Warfare
There is a very extensive and broad discussion associated with
the concept of Information Warfare and is difficult to
distinguish true facts from pure speculation. However there is
enough evidence to point to the reality of a new capability.
Trying to define Information Warfare in a definitive way would
lead to premature military policies as to what is and what is not
Information Warfare. However, it is equally important to put
forth some definitions that will help in bounding the problem and
help in reviewing our traditional military warfare activities.


The various terms that are used in this area, Info-Doctrine,
Cyberwar, Netwar and others terms indicate that it is still early
in the debate. As yet nobody has put forth a set of definitive
and complete tenets of Information Warfare. There are
organizational effort to structure what are seen as Information
Warfare activities. This permits a certain amount of
classification work as to the threats, capabilities and
objectives of Information Warfare. It is also evident, as
presented earlier, that the emerging synergistic effects of
Information Warfare require a more sophisticated conceptual
framework so as to help integrate various the various traditional
but separate capabilities such as EW, Intelligence collection,
Target and Damage Assessment, IT security etc. The roles and
mission of those capabilities are well known and need not be
highlighted here. The intent here is to refine the understanding
of Information Warfare by putting forth a conceptual framework
and permits the development an action plan. Specifically towards
the development of a military Information Warfare capability
adapted to the requirements of an information based society.


3.1  Information Superiority
The guiding Vision for Information Warfare can be simply stated:
Information Superiority through the availability and use of the
right information, at the right place, at the right time, to all
decision makers, while denying that information to the enemy.
Information superiority is achieved through the development of
Core Capabilities such as Knowledge Management, Joint
Surveillance, Information Warfare and Information Technology.
Information Warfare and Knowledge Management are new areas.


3.2  Definition of Information Warfare
38.  There are several definitions of Information Warfare that
are being put forward, mostly by US Military Organizations and
Services. Whereas the Navy and Air force have Information Warfare
capabilities, the Army is proposing Information Operations as
being the mainstay of their conceptual approach. To be noted is
that Russian Military Doctrine has always included the notion of
Information Weapons; a fusion of advanced command and control,
communications , intelligence systems, psychological and
electronic warfare.

Information Warfare need to be seen as a cybernetic cycle.
Observation, Analysis, Options Selection Decision Making, and
Execution. This process is articulated in an Information Warfare
Cycle as illustrated in figure 5.










                            Figure 5
                  The Information Warfare Cycle


Information Warfare concerns itself with the control and
manipulation of information and information flows. Specifically
with the acquisition, process, storage, distribution and analysis
of data and information. At a conceptual level, IW consists of
all efforts to control, exploit, or deny an adversary's
capability to collect, process, store, display, and distribute
information, while at the same time preventing the enemy from
doing the same. The intent is to control, manipulate, deny
information, influence decisions, and degrade or ultimately
destroy adversary systems while guarding friendly systems against
such action.

This definition is quite broad but in many respects sufficient to
show what Information Warfare as a concept authorize and
legitimize new capabilities, as well as integrate the well
established and understood arsenal of environmental capabilities
(Joint, Army, Navy, Air Force) as well as concerned Governmental
agencies.


3.3  Advantages of Information Warfare
As indicated earlier, it is in the new realm of networked systems
that this definition finds its new applicability. To achieve
information superiority in a networked information system prior
to or in support of the traditional war fighting activities,
offers the government and the military a whole new range of
options never seen before:

            Information Warfare can prevent battle and reduce
          engagement. This will lead to more integrated and sophisticated
          conflict resolution activities prior to a military engagement.

            It will permit the maximum exploitation of all available and
          relevant information.

            It will help in exercising our understanding of the conflict
          in all its political, social, economic and cultural dimensions as
          well as facilitate action.

            It will ensure a superior use of our networks and
          Information Technology investments.

            It will create synergy by remove the logical and
          organizational barriers between the different units and
          capabilities. It will help focus Coordination and Cooperation at
          all stages of the conflict.

            It will facilitate change; and

            It will better explain past success and failures.


To support these objectives, new capabilities and skills are
required. These expectations originate from the integration of
the previously segregated activities such as Intelligence,
Security, Joint and Combined Operations, Electronic Warfare,
Psychological (Heart and Minds) type of Operations, supported by
global and inter-operable Command and Control Information
Systems.


3.4  Command and Control Warfare
We see that Information Warfare activities is not strictly done
only by the military, it is an activity that need to be
shouldered by a number of governmental agencies. No single
service, agency or department is capable of doing all Information
Warfare activities. It can only be achieved if the government
brings all of its information production and exploitation assets
to bear on a situation.


If Information Warfare is not just a military responsibility then
there needs to a specific focal point for military Information
Warfare activities. This area is called Command and Control
Warfare. Without a doubt, however, the military bears the brunt
for ensuring that IW activities are done such as peacekeeping and
humanitarian aid. These are cases of concerted and coordinated
efforts between Government agencies, NGO, and the military. But
as always, in final analysis, it is the military that deploys or
will be called to develop Information Warfare assets.

This proposes that in purely military terms, Command and Control
Warfare capabilities will establish a large proportion of a
government Information Warfare capability. Within military
operations Joint Command and Control Warfare is the only
appropriate avenue for Information Warfare activities directed
against other Command and Control systems and requires that Joint
Command and Control Information Systems become the military
supporting infrastructure for conducting Information Warfare
operations. Unfortunately this also begs the question if it
appropriate for the military to support Information Warfare
operations against other elements of a societyÆs information
infrastructure in periods that are not characterized by open
warfare.

Command and Control Warfare focuses on trying to maintain control
over enemy military Command and Control Information Systems
assets. The problem is that Command and Control Warfare in itself
lacks completeness since it does not integrate the broader
strategic cultural, social, economic and political constraints
into relevant action in support to the crisis management
activities that normally occur during the earlier phases of
conflict as illustrated in figure 6.





















                            Figure 6
                 Spectrum of Military Activities

The US concept of Operation Other Than War (OOTW) is also address
the fact that Information Warfare activities need to happen
earlier in the spectrum of conflict activities than the ones
purely associated with Command and Control Warfare activities.
This therefore requires that the military and other agencies
coordinate and cooperate in ways that have not been examined in
the past. In Canada this is less of a problem because of our
limited resources have always accentuated cooperation and
coordination between Other Government Departments (OGD).

The recent development of a Canadian Maritime Network (CanMarNet)
is an example of a interdepartmental information network that
supports the exchange of maritime information between DND, the
Department of Fisheries, the Coast Guard, and the RCMP. This
system proved its value in the recent fishery conflict with
Spain. And one can argue quite successfully that this conflict
was a good example of Information Warfare. In this situation the
military provided the surveillance, monitoring and communication
infrastructure and the fisheries department acted in a lead
capacity. These type of interdepartmental network will evolve and
grow rapidly over the next few years. A governmental network will
be able to mobilize and coordinate action throughout departments.
Eventually, these networks will becomes elements of a larger
government information infrastructure.


3.5  New Military Information System Vulnerabilities
At present Information Warfare in Canada is discussed more active
in the private and civilian sector more than in the military.
This because of US computer security organizations such as the
National Computer Security Association (NCSA) that predict that
an Information War will be waged against the most vulnerable
elements and infrastructure components of a nation. And these are
mostly civilian information infrastructure components. This is an
easy target because an information intensive nation is very
vulnerable to Information Warfare. Deliberate and planned
computer sabotage, the seeding of viruses, global disinformation,
and subversive control of a network could cripple the economy,
wipe out banks savings, shut down phone systems, subvert trust
and belief in democratic institutions and disrupt essential
services and organizations. Through data manipulation, theft,
system sabotage and other means, entire economies and
institutions may be rendered unworkable. These kinds of scenarios
raise serious questions about who should have the capability to
defend national interests. But it also blurs the distinction
between military and civilian Information Warfare activities,
mandates and responsibilities.

With the present military trend to acquire more and more
commercial software and hardware products, and the growing need
for system interoperability, for better or worse, the civilian
information infrastructure, the governmental information
infrastructure, and the military information infrastructure are
going to amalgamate. This situation causes military
infrastructure to be increasingly exposed. Furthermore these
infrastructures are structurally weak and assailable because they
are built using products that meet commercials needs first and
not for military mission critical operations requirements.

Interoperability tends to stress standardization but too much
computer system standardization is a liability and a
destabilizing factor. Whole systems can become outdated or out
performed by the creation of a new component. They can become
incapacitated quickly, incapable of recovering from a single
system wide attack on a single but common element to all
components of the network such as a unique operating system or a
unique communication protocol. A certain amount of controlled
evolution through diversity confers to the network a certain
amount of robustness and vitality.


3.6  Displacement of Warfighting Activities
Displacement in wealth producing activities have always from the
less efficient sectors of activity towards efficient ones. As
seen in the development of western society the creation of wealth
has passed from agricultural sector, to industrialization sector,
and is now centrally located in the information based activities.
Each new structure of wealth creation subsumes previous or older
ones. They do not totally replace them but incorporate them and
make them more efficient. There is still an agricultural sector
but it has gone through mechanization then industrialization and
now digitization. More is produced with less people, resources
and investment because the processes are so much more efficient.
As societies fight the same way they create wealth then there
will be also a displacement of focus of military capabilities.
New way of warfigthing will never totally replace older
capabilities but they will integrate them into more efficient
processes as well as displace the focus of military activities
towards newer and more effective configuration of technology and
organizational structure.

Fighting conventional weapon systems requires well established
military capabilities that rely on traditional hierarchical
structure but faced with new vulnerabilities, a newer form of
command structures with a more effective information
infrastructure is required. It is within this newer command
structure that the older military capabilities will be subsumed
by the more effective command decision making processes. In this
information age, we must know how to fight information wars as
well as maintain our ability to fight the conventional wars.


3.7  Information Warfare Conceptual Framework
A conceptual framework must serve several purposes. It must be
able to structure a series of new conceptual component by showing
the causal relationships that exist between them. It must also be
able to integrate older concepts into this explanatory scheme.
This amalgam of old and new will help show what new capabilities
and opportunities.

To fully analyze what Information Warfare bring to strategic
analysis several new matrixes will be developed. The first one
will be a Target Matrix. This will help in the classification
problem of what is are different classes of target that
Information Warfare focuses on. This second element of our
conceptual framework is the Weapon Matrix. It will show the new
arsenal that needed to wage a Information Warfare. Naturally most
the discussion is about the potential of such ôweaponsö but as
the capabilities exist today there is need to explore how they
would be used during a conflict.

In order to build the most complete and congruent IW analytical
framework possible, one that can apply in all situations using
the Weapon and Target Matrix, a third one will be generated an
Information Warfare Strategy and Planning Matrix based on
possible targets and types of weapon needs to be developed. The
strategic objective will determine both the type of target and
the type of weapon. This matrix should be used as part of the
strategic planning process. Along one axis Target Analysis will
reveal the potential classes of targets. Along the second axis we
can list the types of weapons that could be perpetrated against
these targets. The resulting table offers insight as to the
outcome of using a specific type of weapon on a specific target.


3.7.1     Information Warfare Target Analysis
The following Target Matrix is developed focused specifically on
the decision making and its underlying support. If adversary
decision making processes are paralyzed or subverted then the
enemy system is under our control. This somewhat radical keeping
in mind that several centuries of history have distilled
principles of war but this approach is suitable to examine
potential Information Warfare targets. There are presently other
approaches that have their grounding in the capabilities
themselves ( Deception, EW, OPSEC, Psy Ops, Physical Destruction)
but these are somewhat ôbottom upö approaches. This framework is
more abstract but somewhat more powerful than other proposals.


3.7.2     Types of Target
The aim is to attack or disable the principal or major decision
makers via their information infrastructure. As seen in the
earlier discussion on control , attacking the decision making
mechanisms will directly affect the control of the system. The
main targets classification method is around the binary
relationship between goals and decision makers. Whatever the size
of the adversary there is a fundamental relationship between the
numbers of decision makers and the goals they seek to accomplish.
There are three main categories: Single decision makers with
single a single goal, multiple decision makers that share the
same goal, and finally multiple decision makers with multiple
goals (or not sharing the same one).

Any information systems can now be investigate in terms of a
socio-technical structure. At present, the best way to go about
it is to determine the decision nodes of the system. The could be
computer processes or users. By attacking these points the entire
decision cycle as well the decision types ( good or bad) and
quality (timely, relevant, accurate) can be affected. It is
necessary to discuss only categories of targets since this
discussion is focused on the analytical framework.


3.7.2.1   Single Decision Maker /Single Goal
This is the monolithic organization. Mostly individuals or a very
autocratic organization but could extend this class of targets to
single central computational process (mainframe). Basically what
we have here is a unique decision making process with a unique
goal. It is a very focused target with a well bounded domain. All
control functions are subject to this unique decision maker.

For example if we focus on attacking individuals we could either
use their dependence on their system against them or focus the
attack on their data shadow. Extensive reporting of privacy
issues and problems have helped understand the problem. One could
see how the information used in point of sale for purpose of
restocking can be used to determine individual consumption habits
that might interest insurance agencies for the determination of
incidence of heart attacks and rate setting. Also in a rigid
command and control organization focusing on the leaders severs
the decision making capability from the rest of the organization
making it somewhat headless. In the case of an unique
computational process the whole system is brought down or
subverted. This type of target is seen as relatively easy to
attack and quite vulnerable. Modeling this class of targets is
seen as quite feasible and of low difficulty.


3.7.2.2   Single Goal / Multiple Decision Makers
The next type of target is an control structure in which there
are there are several points of control. They could be either
automated or human and are distributed and could be dispersed
over a geography but having the characteristic that all the
decision making agents are focused on achieving a unique goal.
This organizational structure is more complex but its dynamics
are know and understood. Some archetype systems could be Command
and Control Information Systems limited commercial and private
business networks, .

This is the area of inter-organizational networks and
governmental information infrastructure such as Saber and Wall
Mart, America On Line, DREnet, etc.  These systems are the
pillars of a nation, its economy, and government services.

These structures have a major portion of their functionality that
rely on sophisticated automated processes. Furthermore they are
increasingly replacing human decision makers. Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI), Financial Institution Message Authentication
(FIMAS) and Just In Time logistic support are networks in which
decision makers are primarily econometric models (as discussed in
the Knowledge Management section). The shift from human to
automated computer based decision makers is the trend in
knowledge intensive organizations such as the military and
specifically in command and control systems. Modeling these types
of system are difficult and are principally based on
stochastic/probabilistic, causal models, and time series
extrapolation methods.


3.7.2.3   Multiple Goals / Multiple Decision Makers
In this class of targets we can group transnational and
international organizations such as NATO, the United Nations, the
European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
etc. Although these are emerging global structures, at the rate
of network growth, these organizations will come to rely
extensively on global information networks by the turn of the
century. At this level it is possible that Information Warfare
will take on the flavor of economic war. Continentalization of
Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim nations postulates that
tensions between and within this triumvirate will be forthcoming.
It would be based on market capture and dwindling natural
resources. In these ecological-like structures multiple decision
makers are motivated according to specific but different agendas.
Some of these objectives when taken as a whole might present
several main poles of attractions. Polarization between these
poles if they differ then conflict overtakes cooperation.

                    Archetype     Reason for     Modeling
                    Structure      targeting    Complexit
                                 Disruption of      y
      Single DM/   Monolithic       Central        Low
      Single Goal   Hierarchy       control      (linear)
       Multiple    Organizatio    Economy of      medium
          DM/          ns            scale      (statisti
      Single Goal                 Economy of       cal)
                                     force
       Multiple     National/     Economy of       high
          DM/      Transnation       scope      (chaotic)
       Multiple        al           Synergy
         Goals

                             Table 1
                     Target Analysis Matrix


3.7.3     Types of Weapons
There has been a lot written recently on what would an
Information Warfare look like. Scenarios focusing on Hacker Wars,
Electronic Warfare, Information Blockades etc. have been
developed. But here again these types of approaches are bottom up
analysis that take their origin in specific capabilities. There
has not been a systematic approach to an Information Warfare
weapon taxonomy. At present time there are three main classes of
weapons which could be used to wage Information Warfare. The
classification is based on the effects of the weapons and not on
the weapons themselves. The effects of these Information Warfare
Weapons can be Physical, Syntactical, or Semantic. The use of a
physical weapon will result in the permanent destruction of
physical components and denial of service. A Syntactical weapon
will focus on attacking the operating logic of the system and
introduce delays or unpredictable behaviors. A Semantical weapon
will focus its effects on destroying the trust and truth
maintenance components of the system.

As a general observation, the number of network attacks has
increased tremendously over the last few years. This because it
is not solely a technical problem. Tools of the hacking and
cracking trade such as Satan, stealth and polymorphic virus
builders are spurred on by the rapid spread of all kinds of
public and private networks. Network analyzers and virus builder
kits are readily available and at no costs. Knowledge and
information about these tools and capabilities flows quite
freely. So by leveraging both the power of these software tools
and the weakness of a network, either surgical precision or
massive disruption can be achieved on the overall decision making
process of an organization.

Information Warfare weapon technology is not at present time a
limiting factor but rather the present state of doctrinal, legal
organizational knowledge about these issues. Couching the weapon
capability in terms of Defensive versus Offensive Information
Warfare is a discussion as to the legitimacy of Information
Warfare activity. The US has approached this dilemma by
separating Information Warfare into two distinct parts; Offensive
Information Warfare (OIW) and Defensive Information Warfare
(DIW).

The US military is focusing on developing a defensive capability
only. This is seen as acceptable and a legitimate Information
Warfare activity. But just doing DIW does not negate the
necessity to probe and act in an aggressive way. These active
capabilities are required in order to know to what extent are the
vulnerabilities within their own systems. And to take these
actions requires an active capability. An OIW capabilities. So
talks about Defensive Information warfare without combining it
with Offensive Information Warfare is missing out on the synergy
that is required to become truly innovative in Information
Warfare.

A Vulnerability Analysis capability is one of the means that
ensure that an Information System has been efficiently and
securely configured. Several essential activities must take place
to perform Vulnerability Analysis such as probing to size the
network and locate all its elements, determine access points,
install agents and covert processes, explore, monitor and
exploit. These are all ôactiveö measures. For simulation and
wargaming, Defensive Information Warfare needs an Offensive
Information Warfare capability (Red cell) to achieve a relatively
safe risk management stance. Turning the capabilities inward or
outward, and calling them different things is a false separation
as they are two sides of the same coin. But because of the
sensitivities involved a Defensive Information Warfare stance is
politically and legally a more acceptable position than Offensive
Information Warfare. In order to develop a complete conceptual
framework we must look at Information Warfare as a continuum
going from a Defensive stance to an Offensive stance. As the DIW
is a question of technical security and more a reaction to OIW, I
will primarily focus on Offensive Information Warfare.


3.7.3.1   Physical Effects
This type of effect is achieved through weapon found in the realm
of the traditional "hard steel on target". The physical
destruction of any information structure offers complete denial
of services. There are a number of capabilities that are
available to do this and they comprises all the traditional
weapon systems such as missiles, bombs, sabotage etc. Targeting
for destruction a network is easy. A node and net evaluation must
be done so as to cripple effectively the network. And this type
of analysis applies to other supporting networks such as
electrical and telephone grids etc.

Also there is more and more research being done on Directed
Energy Weapons. They are categorized under the heading of Radio
Frequency weapons. They are devices which destroy by radiating
electromagnetic energy in the (RF) spectrum with wavelength's
greater than 1 mm (frequency less than 3000 GHz). Suffice it to
say that a pulse could have handicapped the operations at the
World Trade Center more than the bomb did. These weapons are seen
as a very important development because they enable non-lethal
use of force. Technology demonstrators should be available within
the next several years.

There is also the question that a system can be destroyed from
the inside using malicious code, a virus. Virus can change
setting that can permanently damage certain hardware components.
But generally virus will destroy or corrupts data files and
executable programs. As the denial of service would only be
temporary. Recovery would be dependent on the availability of
having planned disaster procedures such as having available CERT
teams, mirrored and redundant systems using different hardware
and software systems, or off site/off line data storage. So virus
fall mainly within the next class of Information Warfare class of
effects


3.7.3.2   Syntactic Effects
There new Information Warfare weapons have specifically emerge
for the domain of information systems and networks. New viruses
are being created an incredible rate as well as their counter-
measures - anti viral software. Available now on the market are
meta programming environments that "incubate" viruses in
accordance with the desires of the attacker. The variety and
combinations are daunting; Cruise viruses are capable of
destroying specific data sets. Stealth virus conceal themselves
from detectors and monitors. Polymorphic virus encrypt themselves
using variable keys. There are also new Protected Mode viruses as
well as the standard common file infector and boot sector
viruses. This class of weapons aims to control or disable the
operating logic of the targeted networks and systems. Using the
operating systems software as well as the different utilities,
the virus can make the system to act upon data in a different way
or even simply waste cycles.

Virus need to be introduced into an information system either
through infected discs or through a network connection. It is
also to be noted that in most instance there is a separation
between the data and the process that manipulates the data. But
with the new Object Oriented Development (OOD) approach, data and
process are packaged together. OOD supports modularity in system
building and reuse of components. In many respects OOD is an
ideal opportunity for planting and disseminating Trojan horses.
All these issues are hotly debated and discussed. Technically the
capability exist and he question for the military is what to do
with such as capacity. Incidences of viral infection have risen
but their spreading are less extensive due to the increased use
of anti-viral software. Incidents of system break-in have also
risen in the last year. Cracker toolkits are so sophisticated
that any weakness in a network will be found out quickly. New
types of sophisticated network analyzers have several layers of
heuristics built in. Cracking systems now has more to do with the
sophistication of some of the Knowbots, tools and poor system
security configuration (due to general lack of knowledge on the
part of system administrators) than with the ingenuity of the
perpetrators. Anomalies in systems behavior are normally not
recorded if they occur in a purely random pattern. Virus that
were meant to stay under ôdeep coverö could go undetected. For
example some monitoring software application can check the clock,
disable the modem speaker, place a call, transmit data and
disconnect when done. There is a lot of fear that Internet
software takes information off the userÆs disk and passes it over
the network. Users are somewhat used to a bit of erratic behavior
on the part of their system and would this would permit viruses
to remain hidden for a long time if they act in an non disturbing
way.

There is a discussion on what I call the Jeckel and Hyde virus
that has its origin during the period in which memory was sparse
and program had very little space in which to be stored. A
program could be written so that it would run in a standard way
but by bit shifting the code it could be run as a totally
different program. The problem here is that this type of virus
construction would be almost impossible to recognize as it is
valid software in its first mode. Furthermore, virus that can
make use of ôcover channels and cover timing ö3 capabilities to
communicate would render even some aspect of security protection
measures completely ineffective.

System vulnerabilities increasingly are being actively sought
after and taken advantage of when found. Here lies one of the
core doctrinal axiom of Information Warfare. Control the enemy's
network and you control his decision making processes and his
awareness and understanding of events. here is no requirement to
destroy his systems or his data if this system is being
controlled you. The use of Virus as Information Warfare weapon
specifically targets the structural component of the information
infrastructure i.e. the operating logic of the system.


3.7.3.3   Semantic Effects
The objective of this class of weapon is to affect and exploit
the trust users have in the information system and the network,
as well as affect their interpretation of the information it
contains. Semantic Effects focus on manipulating modifying and
destroying, the mental models, the awareness and representations
that are developed, and constructed through the use of an
information system. Whether it be a civilian organizational
information system or a military command and control system. This
is quite a challenge but this is the new dimensions of what use
to be Psychological  Operation, and Deception. These class of
Information Warfare ôweaponsö alter the decision makers
representation of what the information system portrays as the
"real" world.

These weapons seek to affect not the information system itself
but the behavior of the users and influence their decisions. The
best way to think about these weapons are as ôMemesö or virus of
the minds that can be created via the information systems.
Spoofing other peoples identity, selective spamming, broadcasting
specific arguments and discourses, misinformation, slogans, and
information overload can influence decision makers to a point
where they misinterpret what is happening. Humans have been
employing this strategy for centuries in all but the case of
networked systems this has taken a new dimension . Trying to
recreate a close representation of what exactly is happening in
the real world is the most difficult part of conflict management
and warfare. However, this type of consideration will become more
and more central to the Information Warfare debate as Social User
Interfaces (SUI) start populating the systems. Interaction with
Knowbots and Agents and other interface metaphors that might be
subverted to show only specific types of data and information.

In the not so far future, multimedia information system
environments will be the main information management tool. With
this (still to be fully appreciated) context now needs to take
into account the Freytag triangle4 of information attributes that
show difficulty and requirement for more information rise and
fall trough the specific phases of a crisis (exposition, inciting
incident, rising action, climax, falling action and dΘnouement).
As a consequence will require the user to rely even more on
automated processes to search, retrieve, collate, and present
information during the crucial information intensive phase of the
crisis. The danger (or opportunity) is that the ôdramatic
orchestrationö of what we believe as objective information is
always grounded in a specific point of view and therefore open to
manipulation.

Information always reflects something about its source and its
purpose. Already in the inter-networked web where we can have
both real-time and encyclopedic intelligence information fused
from organic and non-organic sources computer mediated activities
will enable the users to increase their active participation from
the strict pragmatic response that come from the reading of a
descriptive text narrative to a full emotional participation to a
dramatic enactment of an event. This will change substantially
the nature of operational activity as the immediacy and emotional
closeness of the event circumvents much of the truth
verification, the ôsanity checksö processes that are usually
constrained by longer decision cycles. The consequences of this
ôimmediacyö of multimedia computer mediated interactions is a
subject of research that is still in its infancy. The combination
of highly emotionally charged pictures, sound, coupled to the
personal engagement of the decision makers will open the avenue
to vulnerabilities that come from intentional orchestration of
preplanned discourse and events. Using morphed and altered images
inserted during a live broadcast adversaries can use the response
of such an orchestration to control rapidly and dramatically
national decision making processes.


            Focus of    Primary Effect    Class of   Modeling
           the attack                      weapons   Complexit
                                                         y
 Physical   Physical      denial of      hard steel     low
                           service                   (linear)
 Syntacti  Structural  operating logic     virus,     medium
   cal                  obtrusion and      agents,   (statisti
                          corruption      filters.     cal)
 Semantic  Behavioral  affecting users     Memes,      high
                       system trust and   dramatic   (chaotic)
                        belief systems   orchestrat
                                             ion

                             Table 2
                Information Warfare Weapon Matrix




3.8  Information Warfare Strategic Analysis Matrix (IWSM)
By placing the intended targets and the levels of effects in a
table we create the final analysis matrix. The Information
Warfare Strategic Analysis Matrix helps investigate meta-
strategic issues that are derived from the planning and decision
making process. The analysis centers around target selection,
weapon selection and the analysis of the outcomes of such
choices.

Information Warfare gives us a series of possible courses of
actions, some of which are already well known and many new areas
for which there are no capabilities yet. This final analysis
matrix incorporates both past military capabilities and
highlights areas in which Information Warfare activities demands
the development of new offensive and defensive capabilities. It
also drive us to seek a better understanding of what is truly
Information Warfare.

In reviewing the IWSM we can deduce that the usage of well know
capabilities such as hard steel has predictable outcomes. For
example, if we wanted to physically destroy an individual's
system, one could plant a virus that would destroy the data or
some of the components making the system and the data unusable,
blow up the system with a bomb, or even steal the system. Either
way the results are the same. The effect is limited and
controllable: denial of service. But this does not necessarily
remove or eliminate the conflict. The intentionally is still
there. Chances are that the conflict will find another outlet or
tool set and continue anew. But this type of action has the
advantage of imposing control and order so that other mechanism
of conflict resolution such as political or governmental can be
put in place to resolve or diffuse the conflict.

However the matrix point out that there are regions of
unpredictable effects with unknown consequence in the management
of the conflict. Further analysis is required in these areas, in
order to develop an understanding, a capability and a defense. It
is certain that Information Warfare activities will move toward
these areas because they represent opportunities for high
payoffs. They represent areas in which Information Superiority
can be achieved without having recourse to the traditional
military warfigting infrastructure. For very little costs a small
organization can wage a pure information war without having to
build an Army, Navy or Air Force. And it is specifically in these
areas that our military must seek new understanding, capabilities
and skills in order to recognize the treat and to defend
ourselves against it.


3.8.1     Predictable Outcomes
In looking at the matrix we see that we already have capabilities
to operate in some areas. Mostly these are areas in which any
actions will produce predictable outcomes. These controllable
outcomes can be generated by a host of actions. This includes the
some elements of C2W such as EW and Physical Destruction. These
effects are obtained through the usage of physical and syntactic
class of weapon on single goal/single decision maker and single
goal/multiple decision maker types of organizations.

For the military this encompass the traditional warfare area. It
is possible to destroy physically all the information nodes of an
dispersed organization but it is quite difficult. Suffice it to
point out that such an objective could be achieved by a
coordinated series of actions that destroy some of the more
important elements of an information system this would achieve
the same intended result. However, the propagation of a network
virus may be much simpler and will have a much more damaging
effect. In some circumstance simply delaying some computational
processes may me sufficient to achieve the same goal. In a Just-
In-Time army logistic system any delay caused by a purposefully
planted syntactical level weapon will damage the effectiveness of
any operation without the victim organization realizing it has
being successfully defeated even before a physical engagement.


3.8.2     Unpredictable Outcomes
However, at present the use of Information Warfare weapons in
other areas of the matrix will result in some unpredictable
effects. In some cases in order to achieve information
superiority, the creation of "ruptures" in the adversary's
command and control systems as well as in the social, economic,
and civil information infrastructure of the a country might be
necessary. In well bounded and closed systems such as command and
control information systems the effects of a syntactical weapon
will have absolutely no collateral damage. But attacking some
other systems will have as consequence a series of effects that
will propagate through several other networks and have negative
consequences on the final objective. Akin to shooting oneself in
the foot.


                   SDM/SG          MDM/SD          MDM/MG
                (Individual)   (Organizational  (Alliances))
                                      )
  Hard steel        easy           harder        difficult
                predictable      predictable    predictable
   Software        harder         difficult      very hard
    Agents      predictable     unpredictable  unpredictable
   Memes and     difficult        very hard     very hard or
   Dramatic     predictable     unpredictable    very easy
  Orchestrati                                  unpredictable
      on

                             Table 3
          Information Warfare Strategic Analysis Matrix

Attacking an economic system will affect all economic system
because they are all linked to one another in a global market
place infrastructure. The reason for this comes from our
understanding of nonlinear systems. Chaotic behavior in a system
can explain some of these effects. Under certain initial
conditions, some of the parameters can be made to create
oscillation in the network, creating positive feedback in the
control mechanisms. This results in catastrophic system behavior.
This chaotic behavior is dependent on the linkages or "coupling"
between the elements in the networks as well as in the linking
relationship between the networks themselves. The system that
will be targeted need to be investigated and the linkages need to
be highlighted as to their sensitivity to propagate negative
effects of Semantic Weapons. Systems and networks can either be
loosely or tightly coupled.


3.8.2.1   Loosely Coupled Systems
Loosely coupled systems have a fair amount of buffering between
the various common  variables that are part of the different
processes and elements. This buffering between systems permit
more stable behavior overall . This stability is due to several
underlying factors. Most of which are part of the information
systems architecture involved. This applies to all three level of
structures at the physical, syntactic and semantic level of the
type of target structure. For example at the physical level of
the Internet the architecture model allows for a fair number of
failures and corruption and still remain survivable overall. But
at the semantic level of the more active and radical Usernet
groups the coupling is quite tight.

Information Systems that support distributed decision makers,
must ensure a reasonable number of checks and balances and help
maintain system stability. Disruption and full control of those
systems is feasible but difficult because of the loosely coupled
decision making processes. However as we automate and move up
towards knowledge enabled organization then more and more
computational processes will take over some of burden for routine
decision making. This changes the interactions between
organization from being loosely coupled to closely coupled.


3.8.2.2   Closely Coupled Systems
In closely coupled systems, then the prevailing conditions in one
system can be amplified through the network to other systems.
This can create the chaotic "butterfly effect" small local
changes cause large effect because of positive nature of feedback
and amplification in the network.  Information systems, inter-
networked organization,  and even global networks, in times of
crisis behave as tightly coupled systems. Positive feedback
mechanisms will create severe ruptures in the normal order of
system behavior, as seen in some of the stock market or
engineering disasters 5.

Command and control information systems and their supporting
networks are also closely coupled networks. Sensor to shooter
coupling with distributed and network decision making will be
subject to chaotic behavior especially if Rules of Engagement
permit third party or remote firing. Recent failures of command
and control systems in blue on blue engagements show how tightly
coupled systems can fail. Taking advantages (control) of these
closely coupling systems will be one of the challenge that
Information Warfare presents to a modern military organization.

Waging Information Warfare using syntactic or semantic weapons
will be particularly effective strategy if the target is a
closely coupled network. Unfortunately the disruption will be
such that the side effects could have a tremendous backlash
within our own infrastructure. Inevitably, the effects will be
transmitted to all participants in the network with unpredictable
side effects and unforeseen disruptions. At present IW weapons do
not have the capacity to limit such types of side effects, but it
is this fact will not be lost on organizations that advocate
terrorism as modus operande. These are well suited terrorist
weapons. The development of Information Warfare defensive
measures are essential as they will be necessary as part of a
civil defense plan.


3.9  IW Control Models and Decision Systems
In developing this conceptual framework, several other concepts
need to be touched upon. As Information Warfare is a new
hypothesis of how traditional military activities position
themselves in relation to one another. Our understanding of other
concepts need to be reviewed and analyzed anew in context of this
new representation of warfare. They are all elements of  military
capabilities such as the shifting role and loss of relative
importance of the platforms in relation to the command and
control network, the problem of control and decision making in a
distributed organization, and the importance of developing a
common shared representation of the conflict and the battlespace.
These are all at present research domains but will become quickly
central issues in the development of Information Warfare
capabilities.


3.9.1     Sensors/Weapons and Platforms
There will be a fundamental shift in the relative importance of
the role traditional platforms will have in the future. At
present military organizations have a small number of large
platforms all having a suitable mix of organic communication
suites, dedicated and specific sensors slaved to a small number
of unique weapons systems. Each have a command and control system
but they are not well integrated as a whole except through
limited bandwidth communication systems. In the future the
emphasis will be to have a large numbers of much smaller
platforms semi specialized around either sensors or weapons with
a smaller command and control systems but all platform are very
well integrated together through a unique and global command
network.

The most important capability of this command network will be the
ability to fuse organic and non-organic sensor information. No
single platform will become the high value unit of the
battleground. The allocation of targets to sensors to weapons
will be done based on a dynamic assessment of critical
priorities. Threat assessment and weapon assignment will no
longer be at the platform level but at the force level. In this
respect individual platforms will become secondary to the command
and control infrastructure that will act as a super weapon/sensor
system. Resource will shift from building the faster bullet to
the more powerful algorithm.


3.9.2     From Simple Cybernetic to Multi-Agent Control
The growth of military command and control information networks
will transform our idea of control. Traditionally, our military
organizations have a rigid and hierarchical structure of decision
making processes. The span of control should be congruent the
scope and importance of the problem at hand problems. This also
increases the confusion between what is tactical and strategic. A
soldier in a foxhole is preoccupied with winning his battle, not
the whole war, as there are too many elements outside his control
but a decision at his level will in a way affect the course of
the war. Was it a tactical situation or a strategic situation?

Our control exemplar is still based on the single decision maker
cybernetic model of control faced with the problem of how to
optimize a single goal under constraints of limited resources and
time. This model served as a template for weapon systems design
and has been adopted for most planning processes but it is of
limited value when faced with the reality of several decision
makers meshed in together through the use of command and control
information system. The problem of predetermining the appropriate
level of control to the right level becomes very difficult. If
decision makers try to optimize the outcome at their level the
result is a global sub-optimization. They win the battles but
lose the war. This is the situation we face now. Because of the
structure of military organization plays against the natural
diffusion of control that comes from being a participant in a
network. Network require different control structures than
hierarchies.

One approach to this problem to try to enhance all the decision
makers understanding of all the constraints faced by the group.
If all the decision makers share the same common understanding of
the battlefield they can in return adjust each their actions to
maximize the outcome of all the decision take together. This
approach is made possible through the use of information systems
operating not a command and control systems but as cooperating,
communicating, and coordinating system.

What emerges is a new mutation in the evolution of information
systems. Computer Mediated cooperation systems that support the
distribution and diffusion of control. This dissemination is
function on how the decision makers concurrently and
cooperatively build the context in which they will take decision
. Each brings to the overall representation a fragment of
information that can be used by others to better understand the
overall context of their own actions and objectives. In Sum they
are building a better global understanding of what is happening,
see a better representation of what needs to be done and can they
take decisions in concert with others to optimize all their
resources for the problem at hand.

The essence of operational control would not be based on the
focused understanding of single decision maker, but in a shared
and common representation of the battleground in which each agent
decides his own course of action based on his understanding of
the total global picture. Much as a beehive behaves as a single
entity even though it is composed of a multitude of independent
actors. Coordination and synchronization mechanisms are not
inherent to a hierarchical structure but from a peer to peer
dialogue and mediation process based on consciousness and
awareness mechanisms. This more complex model of control 6
however, will never replace at all levels the traditional
military hierarchical structure. But it will certainly displace
some levels of command because it is a more flexible scheme that
permits a faster adaptation of the organization to prevailing
changes in the environment.


3.10  Visualization and Semiotics
Command and Control Information Systems continue to evolve. They
will progress from being strictly closed military structures to
open and interconnected true socio-technical structures. With a
large number of participants in the network. Some of the
participants have differing goals as well as in some cases
different cultural background. This bring up the discussion of
interpretation. and the requirement for the development of
systems which fit different cognitive styles and have different
presentation mechanisms. The use of military symbols is a case
and point. For example, military tactical symbols and icons have
unique importance in command and control systems. In many
respects they have a unique grammar. They have a well defined set
of formal rules for syntax, semantics, and pragmatics (reaction
to a symbol that indicates an unknown). These military symbols
will play a critical role in any future shared virtual
environments. Until the system can represent, with a high degree
of accuracy, the object itself, symbols will act as the main
representation method. Symbols permit the rapid understanding of
complex data and information, which range from physical
attributes to final intentions. There are specific military
symbols for almost all air, surface and subsurface objects. They
can represent, foes, unknowns, jokers, prowlers etc. Military
symbols associate by a single icon both the object and its
intention. It is these representations that are the basis for all
operational military situation assessment and decision making. In
fact the present set of symbols are used as the basis for
developing shared representation. Interoperability between
military organizations is expressly based on the exchange of
these symbol sets. However, semiotics analysis shows that the
present military symbol set proposes only a limited and closed
representation of a situation. In situations that do not require
strict military action then these representation do not help in
understanding what is happening.

Specifically, the present symbol set deals with only one phase of
the conflict spectrum, the battle management phase. This is the
last phase of an Information Warfare operation. It represents a
defined problem area in that specific configurations of objects
and events compose logical propositions that speak to, and about
battle only. In future military Command and Control Information
Systems, the present unique symbol sets, with their underlying
phenomenology, create a frame of reference that both explains and
predetermines a specific pragmatic response to these objects and
events. This is the original intention of such a representation.
These representations are very powerful and effective. But as
military organizations are called upon more often to participate
and act in earlier phases of conflict such as aid to civil
defense, emergency response, humanitarian aid etc, as well as in
Information Warfare activities then the present symbol set
becomes a serious hindrance in both the understanding of the
problem and the cooperative search for innovative solutions. A
semiotically richer information environment is needed.


3.11  Officer Training and Education
The present capability of the Canadian Forces to select and
prepare officers to operate under the constraint of the changing
state of information technology falls short of the present and
future needs of the Canadian Forces. The present selection and
development process in the area of information systems is
strictly a "reproduction" of passed officers experiences in
strategic and tactical communications. It does not take into
consideration the fundamental changes that have happened at the
technical level as well as how information technology is changing
the "Command and Control" field of study as well as their
resulting concomitant impact on the CF structure and
organization.

It is clear that in general the technical "revolution" and the
new concepts of"Consultation, Command and Control" (C3) have not
been integrated into the preparation of officers that will be
responsible for these systems. The theoretical conceptual
frameworks are absent in the areas of cognitive engineering,
knowlegege engineering, and modern information system
developement practices and methods. Only certain aspects of new
information management techniques have been incorporated.
Preparation for the problem of managing and fostering technical
and scientific innovation is not part of the present curriculum.

Furthermore, and more seriously none of the aspects of how
command and control information systems creates both order and
disorder, and how it can be used to control uncertainty and
instability are introduced any where in the educational process
of an officer. These critical areas are not being presented or
discussed. In fact the whole area of the impact of information
systems on national security is not even mentioned. An awarness
and an understanding of these issues and principles are
fundamental in preparing individual that have the mandate to
develop, field and operate information systems that will enable
world wide action, national and international cooperation, and
help in the management of incertitude as well as force and
violence in support of conflict resolution.



4.   Conclusion
It is acknowledged that Information Warfare is a reality that
modern military organization will have to adapt to or be subject
to it. New realities require new understandings and out of these
understanding an evolution. New capabilities, organizations,
skill sets as well as new modes of operation. For many this marks
a turning point in military affairs as dramatic as when the
airplane the tank or the radio became part of the military
arsenal. But Information Warfare is even more dramatic than
because it act in a systematic fashion in new dimensions. These
are the abstract domains where knowledge created and information
flows. Already we see that the open flows of information change
the course of systems such as communism and other closed dogmatic
systems. It is interesting to note that Information Warfare as a
concept is in fact a meme that is growing in the mind of the
common culture. If for nothing else we need to understand what it
is so that we realize that there is no such thing as a silver
bullet in warfare. Nor does any advantage stay for long on one
side of the conflict. Information Warfare strictly as an element
of an arsenal used to control will have its day shortly but more
importantly Information Warfare also offers as a method a better
understanding for the reasons of the conflict in the first place.
This in itself is more important. The discussion of what and how
to use Information Warfare should be a discussion not just within
the military or the government but in all areas of society.
Information Warfare is all about meta strategy. A search and
reflection on the causes and linkages of conflict.

In itself the research into a new concept requires the
concomitant development of an epistemology, an ontology, and a
methodology. I have presented elements of all three. But there is
much more to do and to debate. This study of concepts was not
intended to determine which capabilities should be developed nor
how to integrate into present military operations Information
Warfare nor to determine which units in our organizations will
become keepers of this knowledge. This has yet to be done. But
hopefully this report will help those mandated with such
responsibilities to better understand why and what makes
Information Warfare so different.

Information Warfare represent a new challenge for societies. As
the tank and radio combined to change the concepts of maneuver so
does the network and the virus. There is a need to continue to
debate the issues raised in this analysis and to try to
understand what the technology permits and what ethics and
morality dictates. This is not the end of the debate on what is
Information warfare - It is the start.




                        5.   BIBLIOGRAPHY

Advance Planning Briefing for Industry, "Winning the Information
War", United States Army Communications- Electronics Command,
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Symposium held May 11-12, 1994, Ocean
Place Hilton Resort and Spa, Agenda and Description of Sessions,
10 pages.

Arquilla, John and Ronfeldt, David, "Cyberwar is Coming!",
Article copyrighted 1993 by Taylor & Francis, Bristol, PA,
originally published in the Journal Comparative Strategy, Volume
12, no. 2, pp. 141-165.

Benedickt, Michael Ed.. ôCyberspace - First stepsö. MIT Press.
Cambridge, 1991.

Burdea, Grigore and Coiffet, Phillipe. ôVirtual Reality
Technologyö John Whiley and Sons Inc. New York. 1994.

Busey IV, Adm. James B., USN (Ret.), "Information Warfare
Calculus Mandates Protective Actions", Presidents Commentary,
Signal, October 1994, Official Publication of AFCEA, p.15.

Boyes, Jon. & Andriole, Stephen Ed. ôPrinciples of Command and
Controlö. AFCEA International Press. Washington. DC. 1987

Campen, Alan D., ed., The First Information War, AFCEA
International Press, Fairfax, VA, USA, October 1992.

Cook, Lt. Col. Wyatt C., "Information Warfare: A New Dimension in
the Application of Air and Space Power", 1994 CJCS Strategy Essay
Writing Contest Entry, Lt., 37 pages.

Collins H. ôArtificial Expert - Social Knowledge and Intelligent
Machinesö MIT Press. 1990.

Defense Information Systems Agency, "Defensive Information
Warfare (DIW)Management Plan", 15 August 1994, Version l.2, 4
sections and Appendices.

DeLanda, Manuel. "War in the age of Intelligent Machines", Zone
Books Swerve edition New York 1991

Demchak, Chris. ômilitary Organizations, Compleex Machines-
Modernization in the US Armed Servicesö. Cornell University
Press. 1991.

Dretske, Fred. ôKnowledge and the Flow of InformationöMIT press
Cambridge Massachusets. 1981.

FitzGerald, Mary C., "Russian Views on Information Warfare",
Army, Vol. 44, No. 5, May 1994, pp.57-60.

Franks, Frederick M.. Jr., "Winning the Information War:
Evolution and Revolution", Speech delivered at the Association of
the US Army Symposium, Orlando, Florida, February 8, 1994,
Copyright  City News Publishing Company Inc., 1994, 11 pages.

Garigue, Robert. "On Strategy, Decisions and the Evolution of
Information Systems". Technical Document. DSIS DND Government of
Canada. 1992

Garigue, Philippe. ôQuestion de stratΘgie et de MΘtastratΘgieö
╔dition du GREF Collection AthΘna Toronto 1992.

Heim, Michael. ôThe Metaphysics of Virtual Realityö. Oxford
University Press. New York. 1993

Hurska, Jan. ôComputer Viruses and Anti-Virus Warfareö Ellis
Horwood Publishers. New York 1990.

Information Society Journal The, Volume 8, Number 1, 1992,
Published Quarterly by Taylor & Francis, Printed by Burgess
Science Press, Basingstoke, England.

Johnson, Craig L., "Information Warfare - Not a Paper War",
Special Report, Journal of Electronic Defense, August '94, pp. 55-
58.

Johnson, Frederick C and Painter, Floyd C., "The Integration of
Warfare Support Functions", Technology Analysis, Warfare
Integration, C31:1988, pp. 176-182

Kelly AFB, Tex., "EW Expands Into Information Warfare",
Electronic Warfare, Aviation Week & Space Technology/October 10,
1994, pp. 47-48.

Laurel, Brenda. ôComputer as Theatherö Addison-Wesley Publishing.
Massachusetts. 1991.

Levy Pierre. ôLes Techniques de lÆintelligence - LÆ avenir de la
pensΘe a lÆΦre informatiqueö. ╔dition La DΘcouverte, Paris 1990.

Levy Pierre. ôLa Machine univers - CrΘation, cognition et culture
informatiqueö. ╔dition La DΘcouverte, Paris 1987.

Lum, Zachary A.,"Linking the Senses", Journal of Electronic
Defense, August '94, pp. 33-38.

Luoma, William M., "Netwar: The Other Side of Information
Warfare", 8 February 1994, A paper submitted to the Faculty of
the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements
of the Department of Joint Military Operations, 42 pages.

Nagao, Makoto. "Knowledge and Inference" Academic Press, Harcourt
Brace Jovanvich, Publishers, Boston 1990.

Masuda, Yoneji. ôThe Information Society as Post Industrial
Societyö.Institute for the Infromation Society, Japan. 1981.

Poper, Karl. ôThe Logic Of Scientific Discoveryö. Basic Books.
New York. 1959.

Rosen, Stephen. ôWinning the Next War - Innovation and the Moden
Militaryö Cornell University Press. 1991.

Roos, John G., "Info Tech Info Power", Armed Forces Journal
International, June 1994, pp. 31-36.

Science Application International Corporation (SAIC), "Planning
Considerations for Defensive Information Warfare - Information
Assurance -", 16 December 1993, 61 pages.

Sovereign, Michael G. and Sweet, Ricki Dr., "Evaluating Command
and Control: A Modular Structure", Technology Analysis,
Evaluating C2, C:31 1988, pp.-156-161.

Schwartau, Winn. "Information Warfare - Chaos on the electronic
superhighway "Thunder's Mouth Press, New York . 1994

Toffler, Alvin & Heiddi. "War and Anti War" Boston: Little Brown,
1993.

Van Creveld, Martin. ôCommand In Warö Harvard University Press.
Cambridge. 1985

Ziman, John. ôReliable Knowledge - An Exploration of the Grounds
for Befief in Scienceö. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
1978.
_______________________________
1 RAND Report
2 De Lamda
3 The Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria Ver 3.0 Jan 1993
4 Breanda Laurel. Computers as Theater P.67
5 Foster Morrison The Art of Modeling Dynamic Systems-Forcasting
for Chaos, Randoness, And Determinism. Mutiscience Press 1991
6Pandamonium Model - De Landa - War in the Age of Intelligent
Machines